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Abstract. This article deals with the cosmology and ethics of Zhu Xi (朱熹) and 
reconstructs the relation between these two fields of inquiry in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. 
This article opposes the still common view in contemporary scholarship that portrays 
Zhu Xi as a metaphysical thinker who introduced metaphysical notions into the 
Confucian discourse. The true originality and innovation of Zhu Xi was his attempt to 
appropriate the notion of li 理, which was the key term in the metaphysical speculations 
of Chinese Buddhism and was also adopted by the early Song neo-Confucians in their 
cosmological investigations, and to show its relevance and conformity to the classical 
Confucian ethical thought. The article demonstrates how Zhu Xi turns li 理 into a key 
ethical concept through identifying it with the particular course of the growth (xing 性) 
of things and ultimately, with the particular course of human growth (renxing 人性). 
Introduction
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) is generally acknowledged as a great synthesizer of 
Chinese thought. Without a doubt he is a central figure in Chinese philosophy, and 
his influence has reached far beyond his own time and place. Zhu Xi’s writings were 
adopted as an official ideology in China, but his thought provoked discussions in 
Imperial China as well as among contemporary scholars. 
The prevailing view in the contemporary scholarship depicts Zhu Xi as a thinker 
who had developed a highly sophisticated metaphysical system. It is claimed that 
this system, which is concentrated around the notion of li 理, served Zhu Xi as 
an ontological foundation for the classical Confucian assertion of the goodness 
of ‘human nature’ (renxing 人性). By developing this system—as the prevailing 
interpretation has it—Zhu Xi renewed the classical Confucian thought and at the 
same time purportedly departed from it by introducing the metaphysical dimension 
to the Confucian way of thinking. 
The new ‘concept cluster’ that Zhu Xi employs in his writings makes it obvious 
that he did renew the classical Confucian thought. However, the goal of this present 
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essay is to find out what the nature of Zhu Xi’s innovation is. Does Zhu Xi ground his 
ethics and the notion of renxing 人性 on the metaphysical foundation? In order to 
answer this question we will have to see what role li 理 plays in Zhu Xi’s system, and 
how it is related to the notion of renxing 人性 and to Zhu Xi’s ethical considerations. 
In this essay, I claim that Zhu Xi’s theory is best understood as cosmology rather 
than ontology, as he is interested only in the things experienced in our natural world 
and does not pursue the question of the nature and essence of being as such. Thus, 
li 理 is also best explained in accordance to this naturalistic worldview, without any 
references to the transcendent metaphysical reality. In Zhu Xi’s time, the notion of li 理 
was an important part of the metaphysical speculations of Chinese Buddhism and 
was also adopted by the early Song neo-Confucians. However, I claim that Zhu Xi’s 
philosophy is best understood not as an attempt to use li 理 in order to provide an 
ontological foundation to the classical Confucian ethics, but rather as an attempt to 
appropriate li 理 into his natural cosmology and to show its relevance and conformity 
to the Mengzian version of classical Confucian ethics. 
In the first part of this essay I give a brief account of the naturalist understanding 
of the term li 理 in pre-Buddhist Chinese thought. In the second part I give a general 
description of the meaning of the term in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. I suggest ‘congruity’—
meaning the dynamic state or quality of appropriate and fitting relationality, as a 
translation for li 理. In the third part, I mostly analyze The Selected Sayings of Master 
Zhu (Zhuzi yu lei 朱子語類) to show that his philosophy is not concerned with the 
nature and essence of being as such, but rather concentrates on the natural world 
as experienced by humans. In this Zhu Xi remains strictly in line with the ‘this-
worldly’ sensibility of classical Confucians and does not engage in metaphysical 
speculations. In the fourth part, I demonstrate that the identification of the congruity 
(li 理) with the particular course of growth (xing 性) of things provides Zhu Xi with 
a link between his cosmological and ethical concerns. In the fifth part, I demonstrate 
that Zhu Xi links his cosmological notion of li 理 to the notion of renxing 人性 (the 
particular course of human growth). Zhu Xi adopts the Mengzian idea of the four 
sprouts (siduan 四端) as a quality of human sensibility (xin 心) that enables fruition 
of specifically human excellences in their interactions with the natural and social 
environment (ren yi li zhi 仁義理智). Zhu Xi attributes these human excellences 
of interactions to the cosmological notion of li 理, understood as the general and 
pervasive interrelatedness of all things, and brings the notion of congruity li 理 to 
the very centre of Confucian ethics. 
The background of the use of li 理 in pre-Qin thought
The term li 理 has been used by Chinese thinkers for more than two thousand years, 
but its meaning and its content have varied through the different times and the different 
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schools of thought. The ancient Chinese dictionary Shuowen jiezi 說文解字indicates 
that the character li 理 refers to the treatment of a piece of jade (zhi yu ye 治玉也; 
Shuowen jiezi). Earlier, it also meant ‘dividing the land into cultivated fields in a way 
consistent with the natural topography’ (Book of Songs 210, cit. from Hall and Ames 
1995, 212). What is common in these two early meanings of the term is that they both 
describe the interaction of humans with their environment. Brook Ziporyn points out 
that in the earliest stage li 理 is used as a verb rather than as a noun (Ziporyn s.d., 8). 
This correlation and active aspect of the term will be important to keep in mind in our 
subsequent discussion on its meaning in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. 
During the Warring States period (Zhanguo 戰國, 5th–3rd c. BCE) the meaning 
of the term gradually changed; it acquired a philosophical significance and became 
more complex. Although we don’t find li 理 in the early Confucian and Daoist 
texts—Lunyu 論語 and Daodejing 道德經—the Confucian scholars Mengzi 孟子 
and Xunzi 荀子, the Daoist Zhuangzi 莊子 and the Legalist thinker Hanfeizi 韓非子 
were among the first ones to use the term with philosophical implications (Zhang 
1982, 52). In the Zhuangzi 莊子 the term has strong cosmological connotations and 
is used to account for the world order as it is in flux: ‘It is this inscrutable li 理 of the 
heaven and earth that is a condition of the myriad of things’1 (Zhuangzi, Ch. 17). In 
the more authentic Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, the term appears only once in the 
famous passage about the Cook Ding 庖丁 cutting up an ox for the ruler Wen Hui 
文惠. The Cook Ding explains that his knife has not become blunt in nineteen years of 
use because he cuts up an ox ‘observing natural lines’ (yi hu tianli 依乎天理), letting 
his knife slide through the crevices without striking bones or ligaments (Zhuangzi, 
Ch. 3). Here li 理 is understood as natural lines of both separation and conjunction 
within a larger natural entity (for example, the marbling in the flesh that constitutes 
an ox). This connotation of relating with or sticking together will also be important 
in our subsequent discussion. 
In the Hanfeizi 韓非子, li 理 is used extensively, but there is one particular 
meaning of the term in this text that deserves our special attention. In the Jie Lao 解老 
chapter of the Hanfeizi it is said: ‘As for li 理, it is what differentiates square from 
circular, short from long, coarse from fine, hard from fragile’ (Hanfeizi 20.25). Here 
Hanfeizi refers to pairs of related antithetical qualities. That is, any of these qualities 
can exist, can be thought of or named, only as they stand in relation with some quality 
other than themselves. In another passage from the same chapter it is said that ‘Li 理 
are the lines of things’ formations’2 (Hanfeizi 20.23). From this usage we see that 
1  是未明天地之理，萬物之情者也。All quotations from primary or Chinese language sec-
ondary sources are my own translations, unless indicated otherwise.
2  理者，成物之文也。
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li 理 denotes not only relationality, as in previous cases, but is also understood as 
underlying what the particular thing is in its context. 
In the Mengzi, li 理 is already used in an ethical context. Mengzi explains that 
just as ‘mouths have the same preferences in flavors, ears have the same preferences 
in sounds, eyes have the same preferences in attractiveness’,3 equally so everyone’s 
heart-mind (xin 心) has something in common, and that is li 理 and ‘appropriate 
conduct’ (yi 義) (see Mengzi, 6A7). Mengzi didn’t develop this idea further, and thus 
in the Western translations we find many different interpretations of what li 理 means 
here. According to James Legge, what is common to everyone’s heart-mind (xin 心) 
are ‘the principles of our nature [li 理], and the determinations of righteousness 
[yi 義]’ (italics in the original, Legge 2001, 406). In his commentary Legge explains 
li 理 and yi 義 apparently using the Christian ideas as well as the vocabulary of 
the later, neo-Confucian tradition: ‘理=心之體, “the mental constitution”, the moral 
nature, and 義=心之用, that constitution or nature, acting outwardly’ (ibid). Later 
translators have rendered li 理 in this passage into reason (Lau 1970, 164), principle 
(Edmund Ryden in Zhang 2005, 27), and order (van Norden 2008, 151). In yet another 
passage Mengzi uses the term in relation to a musical performance: 
In a complete symphony, the bells announce the beginning, and then the jade chimes bring 
it to a close. The bells’ sounding is to begin the harmonious patterns [li 理]. The ‘jade 
chimes being struck’ is to close the harmonious patterns. To begin the harmonious patterns 
is the task of wisdom. To end the harmonious patterns is the task of sagacity.4 (Mengzi, 5B1)
Because of the lack of references, the meaning of li 理 as it is used by Mengzi 
remains somewhat unclear. However, we may conclude that for him the term is 
describing the re-appearing, meaning-generating, and communally recognizable 
cultural patterns. The important fact, however, is that this notion in his book is 
explicitly linked to one of the most important Confucian ethical notions, both in 
the classical and the neo-Confucian periods, yi 義—‘appropriate interaction’. This 
correlation between li 理 and yi 義 will be important to the further development of 
Confucian thought. 
Li 理 as the ‘congruity’ in Zhu Xi’s thought
Although in the classical period li 理 was marginal in the philosophical discourse, 
it becomes the cornerstone for the whole system of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Li 理 is the 
central category in Zhu Xi’s thinking because it helps to explain all other cosmological, 
philosophical, and ethical notions inherited from his predecessors and synthesizes 
them into one coherent system. The centrality of the term is revealed in the fact that 
3 Translated in van Norden 2008, 151. 
4 Translated in van Norden 2008, 132. 
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Zhu Xi’s teachings were called ‘li learning’ (li xue 理学). Zhu Xi claims to follow 
the tradition of the Lunyu, the Mengzi and the earlier Song 宋 dynasty thinkers: Zhou 
Dunyi 周敦頤, Zhang Zai 張載, and the brothers Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤. 
However, Zhu Xi has to be acknowledged as an originator (together with Cheng Yi) 
of the systematic usage of the term. As Brook Ziporyn notes, the term li 理 
came into prominence as the central metaphysical category rather gradually, seemingly 
through the intervention of Buddhist usages, taking on its decisive role only in Cheng Yi’s 
thought, and further developed by Zhu Xi, who then reads it back into the pre-Buddhist 
tradition, although its actual appearance in the early texts is sparse and problematic. 
(Ziporyn s.d., 3)
The neo-Confucian use of li 理 has been variously translated into Western 
languages.5 The prevalent rendition of li 理 in the last two decades has been 
‘principle’6 or ‘pattern’.7 Deficiencies of these early translations are fully addressed 
in the works of Willard Peterson (1986), David Hall and Roger Ames (see 
particularly Hall, Ames 1995, 211–16), Brook Ziporyn (s.d.), and Stephan C. Angle 
(2009), and therefore I will not repeat them here. My understanding of the term 
depends heavily on the works of these scholars who use ‘coherence’ for translating 
the term, and also on the work of Yung Sik Kim (2000) who simply transliterates 
rather than translates it. 
Peterson, who was the first to suggest ‘coherence’ as the closest translation for li 理, 
intends it ‘to be taken in the straightforward sense of “the quality or characteristic 
of sticking together”, with the connotations varying according to context’ (Peterson 
1986, 14). Hall and Ames are ‘borrowing freely’ from Peterson’s analysis and use it 
in their investigation of the classical usage of li 理. In addition, they point out that 
besides the other early connotations li 理 also indicates the ‘intelligibility’ of things 
(Hall, Ames 1995, 213; also see ibid., n. 65, 303). Ziporyn also adopts Peterson’s 
translation and spells out the important aspect of ‘coherence’ as the characteristic 
of sticking together: ‘I adopt the crucial idea of li as coherence, meaning both the 
sticking together of the component parts of a thing and its way of sticking together 
with its environment’ (Ziporyn s.d., 29, emphasis added). Here, Ziporyn addresses 
a crucial conviction of Chinese thinkers, that is, the continuity between a thing and 
its environment. All these scholars emphasize that in the philosophy of Zhu Xi, li
5 The list of English translations can be found in Wing-tsit Chan’s translation of Jinsilu 近思路 
(Chan 1967, 367). The fullest early investigations into li 理in English are in Needham 1956, Gra-
ham 1958, and Chan 1964. Li 理 was also translated as ‘universal order’ (translated by Foster and 
Hartman in Gernet 1996), ‘universal pattern’ (Graham 1990), also as ‘die Idee’ (the idea) in German 
(Geldsetzer, Hong 1998). 
6 See various works of Wing-tsit Chan, also see Gardner 1990, Wittenborn 1991, Yao 2000, 
Zhang 2005, and others. 
7 See Graham 1990, van Norden 2008, and others. 
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理 has not only a descriptive, but also a normative meaning (see Peterson 1986, 23; 
Hall, Ames 1995, 216). However, Ziporyn is the one who gives the most attention 
to this aspect of li 理. This can be seen from his proposition that ‘li is not just any 
togetherness: it is a valued togetherness’ (Ziporyn s.d., 31). Ziporyn concludes that:
Coherence, in li [理], must cover at least these four senses: sticking together of parts, 
sticking together with the environment, intelligibility and value. … For value is built into 
the notion of li, rather than imposed upon … (Ibid., 30) 
In order to convey the importance of the normative aspect of li 理 coherence, Ziporyn 
says that it is ‘a harmonious coherence’ (ibid., 36). 
Fully agreeing with Ziporyn’s analysis, I would, therefore, suggest that ‘congruity’ 
might possibly be a more appropriate term for translating li 理. In my opinion, 
‘congruity’, meaning the characteristic of ‘exhibiting harmony of parts’, being 
‘appropriate or fitting’, and also ‘a point of agreement’, best encapsulates all four 
senses of li 理 listed by Ziporyn. Thus, the li 理 of any phenomena is the congruity 
of its constitutional structure, both intrinsic and extrinsic, without any meaningful 
way of talking about these two aspects as existing separately. As Hall and Ames 
explain, in this Chinese correlative way of thinking ‘things are continuous with one 
another, and thus are interdependent conditions for each other’ (Hall, Ames 1995, 
214). In this worldview, limits of any phenomena are always relative and provisional 
in the sense that an ‘extrinsic’ relation to other things is at the same time a part of 
an ‘intrinsic’ constitution of each particular thing. The congruity li 理, as a function 
of reciprocal conditioning of things, is also the way that the particular phenomenon 
comes into presence (ontological aspect) and the way it is presented in the human 
mind (epistemological aspect). At the same time, li 理 not only describes what is 
present at any given moment (suo yi ran 所以然), but, being a processual term, also 
implies the possibilities of further expansion and amplification of the congruity (suo 
dang ran 所當然). Because all things present themselves through their congruity, the 
process of growth can be described as pursuing the complete congruity (zhi li 至理 
or qiong li 窮理). Thus, li 理 provides a normative standard for making congruity 
increasingly more appropriate, fitting, and versatile. 
To sum up, the congruity li 理 in its most general usage in Zhu Xi’s philosophy 
denotes the dynamic state of ‘appropriate or fitting relationality’. It is fully 
consistent with the early meanings of li 理 because it is dynamic and processual, 
and incorporates interaction with an environment (Shuowen jiezi), because it 
involves correlation and continuation (Zhuangzi), because it is a source of what a 
thing is in its context (Hanfeizi), and because it involves a normative aspect, that 
is, appropriateness of relation (Mengzi). In this light, the use in the Mengzi of li 理 
and yi 義 (appropriate conduct) as close correlatives in the ethical realm becomes 
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even more understandable: just as everyone’s mouth enjoys appropriate food and 
everyone’s ears enjoy appropriate sounds, so every human’s sensibility (xin 心) is 
satisfied by appropriate, suitable, and fitting interactions (li yi 理義, Mengzi, 6A7). 
I will further ground this interpretation of Zhu Xi’s notion of the congruity li 理 in 
the following analysis of its use in his philosophy and will show how the term was 
incorporated into the ethical discourse. 
The congruity li 理 as a necessary  
condition of things being present
It is widely accepted that Zhu Xi’s philosophy developed, in a large measure, as a 
response to the Buddhist philosophical and religious challenges. Buddhism raised 
many questions that were very different from any of the early Chinese schools of 
thought. At the same time Buddhists appropriated and deployed an importantly 
different philosophical vocabulary. The neo-Confucian attempt to revive Confucian 
ideas and their prestige required a proper intellectual response and, therefore, 
necessitated the formulation of a new philosophical language among neo-Confucian 
scholars. However, the exact meaning of this new language and the degree of 
innovation as opposed to the revitalization of old concepts remains a topic of debate 
in the contemporary scholarship. 
The notion of li 理 has always been considered a cornerstone of that new, 
specifically neo-Confucian vocabulary because of its obvious disproportionate 
importance in the post-Buddhist Confucian tradition. Large numbers of contemporary 
scholars both in China and in the West associate the introduction of li 理 as a key 
notion of the neo-Confucian vocabulary with an alleged shift towards a metaphysical 
orientation and a newly-found interest in a transcendent realm of pre-determinate 
forms or universal normative principles in neo-Confucian philosophy. For example, 
Arthur F. Wright describes a Buddhist monk Zhi Dun 支遁 (314–366) as someone 
whose ‘philosophical innovation’ was 
investing the old Chinese naturalistic notion of li, ‘order’, with a new metaphysical 
meaning drawn from Mahayana philosophy; in this new sense the term came to mean the 
transcendental absolute principle as opposed to the empirical data of experience. (Wright 
1965, 47) 
The twentieth century Chinese scholar Fan Shoukang 范寿康 claims that in China 
from early on a ‘metaphysical essence (形上學的本體) was called dao 道. It seems 
that it was under the influence of the Huayan School 華嚴 that Cheng Yi changed 
the traditional term dao 道 into li 理’ (Fan 1983, 187). Acknowledging that Zhu Xi 
criticized many Buddhist dogmas, Julia Ching traces some of his own ideas directly 
to Huayan: 
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The relationship that Zhu explains between li and qi [氣] … appears parallel to what 
Buddhism, especially Huayan Buddhism, which influenced Chan [禪], has to say about the 
noumenal and the phenomenal, emptiness and its manifestations. (Ching 2000, 184) 
This position is not entirely unsupported by Zhu Xi’s language. Li 理 is interwoven 
with the notions of the Great Ultimate taiji 太極, the dao 道, vital matter-energy qi 
氣, the myriad of things wanwu 萬物, and xing 性 (most commonly translated as the 
‘nature’ of things), all of which are notions on a fairly abstract and theoretical level. 
Li 理 is described as being ‘above’ the physical shape8 (Zhu Zi yu lei; hereafter—
ZZYL, Ch. 95), and to have existed before there was heaven and earth9 (ZZYL, 
Ch. 1). However, understanding li 理 in terms of congruity allows us to see Zhu Xi’s 
philosophy as a systematic and consistent whole without any recourse to the notions 
pertaining to something outside of the natural world. 
Zhu Xi develops a theory, which is better conceived as cosmology rather than 
ontology because he only talks about things (wu 物)10 that are present (you 有 or 
cun 存) in our lived world, but never about the nature of existence or being as such. 
The basis for Zhu Xi’s cosmology is the claim that there are two different aspects 
of each thing being present, and that this holds for everything – from the smallest 
ant to the entire world. These two aspects are qi 氣—what is present, and li 理—
how it is present. Qi 氣, or what is present, is a multitude of diverse shapes, forms, 
various degrees of concentration and different propensities of movement of the vital 
matter energy. This is the active ‘fabric’ from which everything consists, from the 
finest steam (this, most likely, was the initial meaning of the term) to the most solid 
rock, from our dreams to the bodily fluids that sustain the lives of plants, animals, 
and people. Qi 氣, according to Zhu Xi, has a physical shape, a position, and an 
appearance11 (ZZYL, Ch. 95), and therefore is generally perceivable to our senses. 
Zhu Xi makes a distinction between the thing-like qi (qi zhi 氣質 or xing qi 形
氣) that we actually perceive through our senses (like tangible objects) and, what 
Yung Sik Kim translates as ‘merely qi 氣’ and ‘rotating wind’ (xuan feng 旋風) that 
our senses do not register because of its rarefied quality (like a breath). Importantly, 
Zhu Xi is not talking about different kinds of qi 氣, but about differences in the 
8  That which is above the physical shape, is without a contour or a shadow—that is li (形而上
者無形無影，是此理). 
9  未有天地之先，畢竟是先有此理。
10  Wu 物 in ancient Chinese can mean any thing, creature, or entity that is there and makes 
up the whole world (wanwu 萬物). This understanding of wu 物 is also present in contemporary 
Chinese, where such words are used as shengwu 生物 or ‘living-thing’ for ‘organism’; renwu 人物 
or ‘human-thing’ for ‘human, character, outstanding person’; dongwu 動物 or ‘moving-thing’ for 
‘animal’; shiwu 事物 or ‘event-thing’ for ‘thing, object’. In this paper I am using the  English word 
‘thing’ in this most broad way as anything that can be addressed by the pronouns ‘this, that’. 
11  形而下者有情有狀。 
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concentration, speed, and texture of the same unbroken dynamic quantum of qi 氣. 
From the abundance of suggested equivalents for qi 氣 in other languages, it is clear 
that this term is by no means easier to translate from Chinese then li 理. However, as 
Yung Sik Kim points out, qi 氣 
does not seem to have been a difficult or problematic concept for Zhu Xi himself. Except 
when used in such technical subjects as medicine, geomancy, and divination, ch’i [qi 氣] 
was not even a technical concept. Zhu Xi and his interlocutors used the term in a quite 
matter-of-factly manner. (Kim 2000, 31)
A new development in Confucian thinking, especially after Cheng Yi, was that 
Zhu Xi starts to question closely—and in an abstract manner—how things come to be 
present in both an ontological and cognitive sense. His answer is: a thing comes to be 
present through li 理, that is, through the congruity of a thing’s ‘intrinsic’ constitution 
and through the congruity of a thing with its ‘extrinsic’ environment. This congruity 
is unitary, as the environment and a thing are interdependent, with only provisional 
boundaries being negotiated continuously between them. As Zhu Xi explains, 
‘congruity has no inner, nor outer’12 (ZZYL, Ch. 1), and ‘if we talk about congruity, 
then there is no segmentation’13 (ZZYL, Ch. 4). In other words, every single thing 
(wu 物) that is present (you 有 or cun 存) in our world of experience, according to 
Zhu Xi, is not without congruence. In Zhu Xi’s own words, ‘If this congruity is not 
present, there is no heaven and earth, there is no people or things—and nothing can 
be conveyed’14 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). At the same time, for Zhu Xi there is a sense in which 
we can say that things qua things are present because they are congruent as a unitary 
entity, that is, as a particular thing, and as a part of some larger whole. Stephen Angle 
calls this element of li 理 in Zhu Xi’s thought the ‘causal role’ of li 理 (Angle 2009, 
41–4). In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, this ‘causal role’ is formulated as the question of the 
primacy (xian 先) of li 理. Zhu Xi says that ‘Even when a certain thing is not yet 
present, the congruity of it is already there’15 (ZZYL, Ch. 95). And also, ‘Before the 
presence of heaven and earth, all that is there is simply congruity. It is because this 
congruity is present that heaven and earth are present’16 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). 
Thus li 理, in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, denotes the fundamental relationality between 
everything that is present in our world of experience. According to Zhu Xi’s explicit 
assertion (though not thoroughly consistent),17 as the state of relationality, congruity 
12  理無內外。
13  以理言之，則無不全。
14  若無此理，便亦無天地，無人無物，都無該載了。 
15  未有這事，先有這理。
16  未有天地之先，畢竟也只是理。有此理便有此天地。
17  In at least one occasion Zhu Xi uses the term ‘thing’ (wu 物) while talking about li 理: ‘what 
are called congruity and qi 氣, certainly are two things’ (所謂理與氣，決是二物; Da Liushu wen 答
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is ‘not a thing on its own’ because it has no physical shape or body (理無形體; ZZYL, 
Ch. 1). Li 理 is a shapeless (xing er shang 形而上) course or a way (dao 道) of all that 
is in the world. At the same time the term also indicates the root (ben 本) of something 
coming into presence18 (Da Huang Dao fu 答黃道夫, cited from Zhang 1982, 58). 
Explaining Zhu Xi’s understanding in terms of congruity, we see the continuity 
between earlier uses of li 理 in agriculture as the pathways established to designate 
and divide up fields under cultivation, and the inscribing of a piece of jade. Technically 
being not a thing itself, congruity shapes things and their surroundings, brings them 
into presence, makes things distinct, and organizes them from out of the constant 
flux of qi 氣. This process is what Zhu Xi calls sheng 生. In the Chinese language, 
sheng 生 depicting the sprout of a plant appearing from the ground does not entail a 
distinction between the momentary ‘being born’ and the continuous ‘to live’. In this 
worldview ‘to be born’ sheng 生 means to come into relation and to assume a shape 
and distinctness through constant correlation with the surroundings.19 At the same 
time, ‘to live’ sheng 生 is a process of continuously being ‘born’ into new or renewed 
relations. This dynamic process of life as continual generation of congruence is 
forcibly expressed in the mantra: ‘the unceasing process of procreation’ (shengsheng 
buxi 生生不息). ‘Once heaven and earth have taken up their positions, the congruity 
in change can never be exhausted, and thus the procreation of the heavens and the 
earth never cease’20 (ZZYL, Ch. 96). According to Zhu Xi, the congruity li 理 stands 
as a root of this process (sheng wu zhi ben 生物之本) facilitating as it does the growth 
of something into more fitting, more appropriate, and more extended relations. 
An important aspect of this cosmology is that Zhu Xi is not referencing li 理 as 
some transcendent entity that is a source or a creator of existence ex nihilo that would 
in turn also determine the course of development among its creations. According 
to Zhu Xi, ‘Congruity, indeed, is without an affection or intention, has no plan or 
measurement, and does not create or initiate’21 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). As Hall and Ames 
point out, ‘In the absence of teleological guidance, there is only an ongoing process 
of correlation and negotiation’ (Hall, Ames 1995, 214). For these reasons it seems 
劉叔文, cit. from Zhang 1982, 59). W. Peterson is evaluating this instance as lapsus linguae on the 
part of Zhu Xi: ‘Zhu Xi’s vocabulary may have failed him here’ (Peterson 1986, 19). Angle, on the 
other hand, maintains that Zhu Xi had a ‘problematic tendency to reify li’ (Angle 2009, 38). Kim has 
similar position (see Kim 2000, 27). However, Zhu Xi’s assertions that li 理 is not ‘a thing’ (‘congru-
ity is not a separate thing on its own’; 理非別為一物; ZZYL, Ch. 1), in my opinion, are much more 
explicit and prevailing. 
18  理也者，形而上之道也，生物之本也。 
19  It is interesting to note that in traditional Chinese way of age reckoning a newborn starts at 
one year old at the birthday. Being in the relation with one’s mother during the pregnancy apparently 
makes one being born before coming into the world. 
20  天地設位，而 變易之理不窮，所以天地生生不息。
21  理卻無情意，無計度，無造作。
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more fitting to avoid the ontological language of ‘being’ or ‘existence’, and to use the 
existential language of ‘to be present’ or ‘to come into presence’ instead. It seems that 
for Zhu Xi the fundamental cosmological question is not ‘where the existence comes 
from’, but rather ‘how do the myriad of things wu 物 crystallize out of the everlasting 
flux of qi 氣?’ His answer is—through the process of growing congruence li 理 of 
the physical (xing er xia 形而下) entity—qi 氣. Stephen Angle points out:
According to Neo-Confucians, a ‘thing (wu 物)’ is a dynamic configuration of the matter-
energy they call ‘qi 氣’. … This, in turn, helps to explain why Neo-Confucians saw no real 
difference between a ‘thing’ and an ‘event (shi 事)’. (Angle 2009, 38) 
Here we can see the clear continuation of ideas from classical to Song Confucianism. 
Roger Ames is addressing this same issue when he insists that:
The phenomenological world in classical China is an endless flow, evidencing its formal 
character only as ‘trans-form-ation’. … What we take to be ‘things’ are in fact a ceaseless, 
processive flux of ‘events’, where it is the interstices among the shifting dispositionings of 
these events that is the fecund source of all life and growth. (Ames 2010, 80) 
In this sense, congruity is a necessary condition of the way that everything in 
our world becomes present, including the world itself: ‘It is only after there is this 
congruity, that there is this qi 氣. At the same time, only when there is this qi 氣 that 
this congruity has a place to settle. Whether [it is] as big as the world or as small as a 
mole cricket or an ant, all things come into presence this way’22 (答楊志仁, cit. from 
Zhang 1982, 59). 
Seen from this perspective, li 理, in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, can by no means be 
interpreted as a transcendent,23 ‘other-worldly’, or a context-independent entity. Nor 
can it be taken as a ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ guiding the development of the myriad of 
things. In Zhu Xi’s system, no ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ —be it outside or inside—facilitates 
the birth, growth, or decay of things. It is a function and an outcome of the vast web 
of interactions among multiple entities, negotiating their boundaries and exhibiting at 
least minimal congruency. Because of these ‘lines’ of sticking together appropriately 
(li 理), it becomes possible to comprehend a thing as coherent in itself and 
distinguishable from other things as one particular thing. Describing the congruity li 
理 as a metaphysical term does not do it justice, because, according to Zhu Xi, there 
is no congruity without the psycho-physical ‘stuff’ qi 氣 24 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). In Zhu 
Xi’s own words, ‘Congruity is not a separate thing in itself but is rather present in the 
22 有此理後，方有此氣，既有此氣，然後此理有安頓處。大而天地，細而螻蟻，其生皆是如此。
23  I am using here Hall’s and Ames’ description of ‘strict transcendence’: ‘A is transcendent with 
respect to B if the existence, meaning, or import of B cannot be fully accounted for without recourse 
to A, but the reverse is not true’ (Hall, Ames 1998, 190). 
24  天下未有無理之氣，亦未有無氣之理。
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midst of qi 氣. If qi 氣 is not present, then congruity does not have a place to hang 
on’25 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). 
If congruity is not present without qi 氣, in what sense does than Zhu Xi maintain 
that congruity comes ‘before’ (xian 先) all things, the entire world, and qi 氣 
itself? Contemporary Zhu Xi scholar Chen Lai 陳來 explains this claim by saying 
that concepts of ‘the former and the latter’ (xian hou 先後) for Zhu Xi can only be 
used in its logical rather than in its temporal sense26 (Chen 2004, 129). From the 
accounts of Zhu Xi’s conversations with his interlocutors, it seems quite obvious 
that for Zhu Xi himself this question of priority did not arise as problematic. I 
believe that Zhu Xi was not a dualist, even if we can quote him saying that li 理 
and qi 氣 ‘are certainly two things’27 (Da Liushu wen 答劉叔文, cit. from Zhang 
1982, 59). He is essentially concerned with things or events (wu 物 or shi 事) that 
we experience in our lived world (tiandi 天地), and he sees these things as unitary, 
although constantly changing, entities. For Zhu Xi, li 理 and qi 氣 are not two 
separate entities among others things, but an explanatory vocabulary that enables us 
to talk about two sides of any particular thing, and from which we can approach each 
and every object of our interest, comprehend it, and explain it. However, because 
Zhu Xi’s interlocutors were apparently pressing him on the priority question, he had 
to allow that on the conceptual level congruity has a priority over the qi 氣. Angle 
makes this same point: 
Since li serves to explain or constrain the movement of qi, then it must be conceptually 
prior to qi. It cannot merely be an after-the-fact description or summary of the patterns 
through which qi moved. (Angle 2009, 40)
That the priority is only conceptual and not empirically temporal is well expressed 
by Zhu Xi’s constant reservation that only when talking from the perspective of 
abstraction (xing er shang 形而上) and only when we want to make a logical inference 
(tui 推) can we describe ‘so called li 理 and qi 氣’ as former and latter. Zhu Xi says:
Fundamentally there is nothing that can be said about what comes first and what comes 
later. Even though this is so, if we want to infer what follows, then we would have to say 
‘formerly there is congruity’.28 (ZZYL, Ch. 1) 
With respect to li 理 and qi 氣 fundamentally there is nothing that can be said about what 
comes first and what comes later. However, when we make an inference (tui 推) about 
them, then it would seem that li 理 is former and qi 氣 is latter.29 (Ibid.)
25  然理又非別為 一物，即存乎是氣 之中；無是氣 ，則是理亦無掛 搭處。
26  理在氣的“先”是指邏輯上的在先，而不是時間上在先。
27 決是二物。Also see my n. 17 for comment. 
28  此本無先後之可言。然必欲推其所從 來 ，則須說先有是理。
29 理與氣 本無先後之可言。但推上去時，卻如理在先，氣 在後相似。
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With respect to what is called li 理 and qi 氣, they are certainly two ‘things’, but when 
we look from the perspective of any specific thing, then these ‘two things’ merge, and one 
cannot separate each into a separate places.30 (Da Liu shu wen 答劉叔文, cit. from Zhang 
1982, 59) 
Someone asked: ‘You have said that if li 理 is present, qi 氣 is present. And it also seems 
that you say that it cannot be discerned which is former and which is latter’. [Zhu Xi] 
answered: ‘To summarize, formerly there is li 理. However, it cannot be said that today 
there is li 理, but only tomorrow there is qi 氣.31 (ZZYL, Ch. 1)  
One can hear an echo of irritation on Zhu Xi’s part in the persistence of his 
interlocutors in asking about the priority of something that Zhu Xi naturally sees as 
one non-analytic whole:
Someone asked about the notion that formerly li 理 is present, and only afterwards qi 氣 
is present. [Zhu Xi] answered: ‘There is no need to say this. Could we possibly know if, in 
their union, li 理 is formerly present, and qi 氣 is present afterwards? Or perhaps li 理 is 
present afterwards, and qi 氣 is present beforehand? Such claims cannot be sustained’.32 
(ZZYL, Ch. 1)
In Zhu Xi’s view, it is only when there is congruity—that is the appropriate and fitting 
relationality—that the flux of qi 氣 acquires direction of its circulation and rough 
lines emerge that enable the particular shapes and manifestations of particular things 
in the empirical world. On the other hand, only when there is qi 氣—that is the 
psycho-physical stuff of the universe—there is a possibility for something to come 
into relation and congruity has a place to unfold. Zhu Xi says: ‘Under the heaven 
there is no such qi 氣 that would be present without congruity li 理; similarly, there 
is no such congruity li 理 that would be present without qi 氣’ (ZZYL, Ch. 1).
The necessary presence of congruity does not determine either the strict ‘nature’ 
of things, or the ultimate goal of their development. As contemporary Zhu Xi scholar 
Chen Lai puts it: ‘When it is said that the myriad of things have one li 理 that does not 
mean that the particular pattern constituting each thing is one and the same’33 (Chen 
2004, 132). The implicit significance of Zhu Xi’s claim on inseparability of li 理 
and qi 氣 is that the congruity li 理 gets its specific content only from the specific 
elements that are standing in mutual relation at any given moment. According to Hall 
and Ames, li 理 ‘may never be considered as independent of context’ (Hall, Ames 
1995, 214). To let these particular elements that are standing in the congruous relation 
out of sight and consideration would mean to look past the li 理. In Zhu Xi’s own 
30  所謂理與氣，決是二物，但在物上來看，則二物渾淪，不可分開個在一處。Also trans-
lated in Peterson 1986, 19. 
31  問：「有是理便有是氣，似不可分先後？」曰：要之，也先有理。只不可說是今日有是理， 
明日卻有是氣。
32  或問先有理後有氣 之說。曰：「不消如此說。而今知得他合下是先有理，後有氣邪； 
後有理，先有氣邪？皆不可得而推究。
33  所謂萬物一理，不是指萬物的具體規律的直接同一。
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words: ‘If there were only congruity li 理, there would be only a void and open world 
without a shape or a trace. Li 理 cannot create, indeed’34 (ZZYL, Ch. 1). Hall and 
Ames call this position ars contextualis: 
Ars contextualis suggests a ‘this–that’ rather than a ‘one–many’ or ‘part–whole’ model. 
Since there is no overarching context determining the shape of other contexts, the world 
is an open-ended affair comprised by ‘thises’ and ‘that’s’ construable from any number of 
distinct perspectives. There is no One behind the many; there are, rather many ones, many 
particular foci that organize the fields about them. The art of contextualization involves the 
production of harmonious correlations of the myriad unique details (wan wu 萬物 or wan 
you 萬有) that make up the world. (Hall, Ames 1998, 40)
To sum up what has been discussed so far, we have to conclude that Zhu Xi in his 
account of congruity li 理 and qi 氣 and their nexus, has engaged in a cosmological 
rather than an ontological discussion. The ultimate concern of Zhu Xi is not the 
nature of existence or being as such. Instead he is interested in how our experienced 
things come into the presence (sheng 生) and the ways in which they are present 
(you 有 or cun 存) with each other and to our human senses. At the same time, we 
cannot claim that Zhu Xi is a dualist, as the only reality for Zhu Xi is our natural 
world of things, events, and people as lived and experienced by us every day in both 
a changing and in a consistent way. In Zhu Xi’s texts we don’t find anything close to 
the Platonic realm of eidos or Kantian realm of noumena. Zhu Xi’s congruity li 理 
has no existence apart and independent from the energy-matter qi 氣 that constitutes 
all natural phenomena. In this sense, Zhu Xi does not depart from the fundamental 
philosophical orientation of classical Confucianism. According to our reading of li 
理 as ‘congruity’, Zhu Xi’s philosophy remains strictly ‘this worldly’, anti-essentialist, 
and processual. The changes in the philosophical vocabulary of Zhu Xi as compared 
to the classical period can be explained as a Buddhist challenge, but this change is 
largely apparent in the form rather than in the content of Zhu Xi’s arguments. As 
Joseph Needham points out, Zhu Xi actually ‘removed Li [li 理] from its Buddhist 
context and restored it to its ancient naturalistic place’ (Needham 1978, 239). On the 
other hand, this change in form is a very important one as Zhu Xi does raise the level 
of abstraction in Confucian thinking and, as I will claim in the next section of this 
essay, introduces this level of abstraction into the ethical discourse. 
The process of the actualization of the congruity li 理 
as the particular course (xing 性) of things
The most important realm for Zhu Xi, just as it was for classical Confucians, is the 
physical world as lived and perceived by humans, where shapes and forms of things 
34 若理，則只是箇淨潔空闊底世界，無形跡，他卻不會造作。Also translated in Angle 2009, 40. 
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and phenomena unfold. In explaining how congruity li 理 functions in the empirical 
world, Zhu Xi employs a formula expressed by his forerunner Cheng Yi— ‘Li 理 is 
one, but its manifestations are many’ (li yi fen shu 理一分殊). Zhu Xi develops this 
idea further by explaining what makes congruity, the foundation of everything that is 
present in the world, to manifest itself in such a variety. 
Zhu Xi’s position is that everything that finds its expression in the empirical world 
does so in a particular place and, more importantly, is bound by particular relations 
with other things. That is why the shape of that particular thing—be it a form of an 
object or the character of a human being—is always unique and different from others. 
Yet the foundation for that particular manifestation is one, common, formless, and 
persistent—it is the congruity li 理, or in other words, the specific relationality among 
things. Zhu Xi said: 
Take rooms for an example, all of them have one li 理, although there is a drawing-room 
and there is a hall; take plants for an example, all of them have one li 理, although there is 
a peach and there is a plum; take this group of people for an example, all of them have one 
li 理, although there is Zhang San and there is Li Si. Li Si cannot be Zhang San, and Zhang 
San cannot be Li Si. … That is what is meant by saying ‘li 理 is one, but its manifestations 
are many’.35 (ZZYL, Ch. 6)
As we can see, every particular human or thing has a common way of being 
present—they all share congruence, that is, they all have the quality or the state of 
corresponding with other things or humans around them. At the same time, every 
human or thing is unique in Zhu Xi’s view and cannot be identified with any other. 
The unique location in the world makes the congruity of each and every human or 
thing particular and one of a kind. It is exactly because it is impossible for two things 
to stand in exactly the same relations with exactly the same environment; no thing 
can replicate the unique congruity of any other thing. Ames is making the same point 
in his account of an interpretative context of Confucian philosophy:
The uniqueness of each particular as a nexus of specific relations attended by its own 
possibilities precludes any notion of strict identity among them—no two things are 
precisely the same. (Ames 2010, 80)
Thus, the congruity li 理 in Zhu Xi’s philosophy is also responsible for distinctness 
and uniqueness of each and every thing in the world. Congruity is that by which a 
thing is as it is. In Zhu Xi’s words, ‘Certain because congruity is present is it that a 
boat can only move on the water, and a cart can only move on the land’36 (ZZYL, 
Ch. 4). Having in mind how the mainstream Western ontology since Plato has tended 
to designate that which makes a thing what it is, Peterson allows that ‘It is not 
35 如一所屋，只是一箇道理，有廳，有堂。如草木，只是一箇道理，有桃，有李。如這眾人， 
只是一箇道理，有張三，有李四；李四不可為 張三，張三不可為 李四。... 言理一分殊，亦是如此。
36  固是有理，如舟只可行之於水，車只可行之於陸。 
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surprising that the li of a thing has been partially understood as its cause, principle, 
function, definition, form or description, but none of these are sufficient’ (Peterson 
1986, 22–3).37 We would add that each of these taken separately for explaining li 
理 is also too much. It is important here to resist the temptation to essentialize and 
substantialize the notion of li 理. In Zhu Xi’s worldview a thing is as it is not by the 
virtue of some innate predetermined quality, independent from the thing itself. Thus, 
the talking about ‘essences’ and ‘nature’ of things (and people) becomes problematic. 
As Peterson puts it,
In a world of flux, where all things are transitory and thus unreliable, we can have the start 
of certainty when we accept that each thing has coherence [li 理] and its coherence [li 理] 
is that by which it is as it is, but is not separable from that which it is. (Peterson 1986, 23)
Having this image of the ‘world of flux’ as an ‘open-ended affair’ suggests that the 
congruity li 理, between a thing and its environment, is also a process that is ever-
changing though also displaying a certain consistency. To account for this process of 
a particular thing coming into presence (sheng 生) and unfolding in a specific manner 
as this particular thing, Zhu Xi uses the notion of xing 性. This term is usually 
translated as the nature of things.38 This translation suggests many implications (the 
notion of innateness, predetermined potentiality, essential as opposed to accidental 
features) that are not necessarily relevant to this Chinese way of thinking. As Graham 
maintains in his analysis of early Chinese thought:
Early Chinese thinkers who discuss hsing [xing 性] seldom seem to be thinking of fixed 
qualities going back to a thing’s origin, except when they are considering inanimate things 
such as water; rather they are concerned with developments which are spontaneous but 
realise their full potentialities only if uninjured and adequately nourished. (Graham 1990, 8) 
Graham suggests that the xing 性 ‘of a thing, then, is its proper course of development 
during its process of sheng [生]’ (ibid., 10). While cautious about Graham’s use of the 
notion of ‘the realisation of full potentialities’, I fully embrace his definition of xing 
性 and I would maintain that Zhu Xi’s understanding of the term is in a large measure 
the same. Thus, the xing 性 of a thing in Zhu Xi’s philosophy has to be understood as 
the particular course of growth (sheng 生) of that thing. In Zhu Xi’s own words, ‘The 
congruity of growth is what we call the course of a particular thing’39 (ZZYL, Ch. 5). 
In Zhu Xi’s philosophy the particular course of growth of a thing (xing 性), just as its 
37  For the refutation of reading something like Platonic eidos (that is, boat-ness or cart-ness) 
into the previous passage of Zhu Xi see Peterson 1986, 25. 
38  See, for example, Chan 1963, and others. For processual reading of xing 性 see Graham 
1990. For processual interpretation of xing 性 as specifically related to the question of the humans 
(renxing 人性), see Ames 1991. For arguments against Ames’s position see Bloom 1994. My reading 
of xing 性 relies heavily on works of Graham and Ames. 
39  生之理謂性。
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congruity li 理, cannot be seen as transcendent to that thing. According to Zhu Xi, 
‘Under the heavens there is no thing without a course of growth (xing 性), thus when 
this thing is present, then this course of growth is present. And when this thing is not 
present, then this course of growth is not present’40 (ZZYL, Ch. 4). 
We see that the notions of congruity li 理 and the particular course of a thing xing 
性 are conceptually linked in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Zhu Xi has promoted and further 
developed the idea initially formulated by Cheng Yi that ‘The course of growth of 
a thing is nothing other than its congruity’41 (ZZYL, Ch. 4). Since congruity li 理 
for Zhu Xi is the way in which the thing is present (you 有 or cun 存) through the 
constant process of that thing coming into relations with its immediate environment 
(shengsheng 生生), the particular course of that thing’s growth (xing 性) is indeed 
the reference to the same notion of congruity li 理. The difference between these 
two notions, for Zhu Xi, is a matter of a different focus of attention. When we are 
concentrating on how something is presented, we are talking about its congruity li 理. 
On the other hand, when we are concentrating on the sequence of the many specific 
manifestations in the congruity of the particular thing, we are talking about its xing 
性, or the particular course of growth of that thing. In Zhu Xi’s words, ‘The course 
of growth of a thing is the many instances of congruity spread across its place’42 
(ZZYL, Ch. 5). The very idea that the cluster of key terms in Zhu Xi’s system is best 
understood as a multi-dimensional structure that looks different from the different 
focus points is suggested by Graham (see Graham 1990, 426). Paraphrasing Graham, 
since congruity li 理 runs through everything that is present in this multifaceted 
world, it itself is comprehended and designated differently once seen from different 
angles. So when the congruity is seen as how all things—material and non-material—
come into presence and are presented to our senses and our minds, it is called the 
way dao 道; when it is observed that the conditions for the congruity cannot be 
determined by subjective desires and will, it is understood as the environment tian 
天; when perceived that from a particular standpoint a succession of spontaneous 
reactions to the environment originate in order to facilitate congruity, it is called a 
particular course of growth (xing 性) of a thing. This point is well supported by Zhu 
Xi’s own claims. Zhu Xi says,
The way (dao 道) is nothing but the course of growth of a thing (xing 性), and the course 
of growth of a thing is nothing but the way. Obviously, it is one thing. Therefore, we need 
to look from which perspective it is approached (huan 喚) and made into the ‘course of 
growth’, and from which into the ‘way’.43 (ZZYL, Ch. 5)
40  天下無無性之物。蓋有此物，則有此性；無此物，則無此性。 
41  性即理也 (when quoting Cheng Yi), or 性便是理 in Zhu Xi’s own words. 
42  性是許多理散在處為性。
43  道即性，性即道，固只是一物。然須看因甚喚做性，因甚喚做道。
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The course of growth of a thing (xing 性) is nothing but its congruity (li 理). When 
entertained as one’s perception, it acts as a course of growth, when entertained from the 
perspective of an event, it acts as congruity.44 (Ibid.)
Once growing things appear, from the beginning we name (ming 名) it the course of the 
growth of things. But when we take this congruity, from the perspective of our environment 
(tian 天) we call it the propensity of circumstances (ming 命), and from the perspective of 
humans we call it a particular course of growth.45 (Ibid.)
Thus, xing 性 in Zhu Xi’s philosophy is ultimately seen as a continuous fruition 
of congruity li 理 (xing shi shi li 性是實理; ZZYL, Ch. 5) throughout the career 
of a particular thing. From Zhu Xi’s adoption of the idea that ‘Li 理 is one but its 
manifestations are many’ (li yi fen shu 理一分殊), we see that for him every particular 
instance of the congruity of a thing and its environment is a manifestation of the 
uniting congruity of the world (tianxia 天下) and the myriad of things (wanwu 萬
物) in it. In turn, the interconnection of li 理 and xing 性 in Zhu Xi’s philosophy 
means that, by extension (tui 推), from realization of a particular course of a thing 
(xing 性) we are also able to reach a full comprehension of the congruity li 理 of the 
totality. This idea is a cornerstone of Zhu Xi’s theory of knowledge as presented in his 
doctrine of gewu 格物, or the investigation of things. Zhu Xi says,
The full comprehension of congruity by investigation of things lies in reading the Classics 
and the Histories, in dealing with things and events, and in realizing what each thing is. All 
that is called the investigation of things.46 (ZZYL, Ch. 15) 
It is obvious from the above quotation that for Zhu Xi, gewu is not solely a cognitive 
exercise but necessarily also has practical implications.47 Thus, the interconnection of 
the categories of li 理 and xing 性 are also made to serve as the cornerstone of Zhu 
Xi’s ethical thought in his theory of renxing 人性, conventionally rendered as ‘human 
nature’ within Western academia. Let us now finally turn to the question of how Zhu 
Xi incorporates li 理 cosmology into his ethical system.
Zhu Xi’s theory of renxing 人性 and attribution  
of the four sprouts (siduan 四端) to li 理
The foundation for Zhu Xi’s philosophical system is his developed cosmology of 
congruity li 理, but its real purpose is to provide a basis for Zhu Xi’s theory of renxing 
人性. From the identification of li 理 with the particular course of the growth of things 
(xing 性) Zhu Xi goes even further showing the relation between the li 理 and renxing 
44  性即理也。在心喚做性，在事喚做理。
45  生物得來，方始名曰『性』。只是這理，在天則曰『命』，在人則曰『性』。
46  窮理格物，如讀經看史，應接事物，理會箇是處，皆是格物。
47  More on practical and moral implications of the gewu 格物 see Kim 2000, 22–5. 
  109C O N G R U I T Y  ( L I )  A S  E T H I C A L  N O T I O N  I N  Z H U  X I ’ S  T H E O R Y  O F  R E N X I N G
人性. When Zhu Xi is reflecting on the general cosmological issue of the interaction 
of congruity li 理 and matter-energy qi 氣, he directs his statements equally to all 
things (wu 物) under the heaven (tianxia 天下). All these things together make up the 
totality of our experienced world (wanwu 萬物), and humans are part of this myriad 
of things.48 However, when Zhu Xi starts to concentrate on the particular course of 
growth of various things (xing 性), he clearly distinguishes between humans (ren 人) 
and the rest of the ‘things’ of this world. In this respect, once again, Zhu Xi does not 
depart from the classical line of thought of the early Confucians. Confucius himself 
famously lamented that we ‘cannot take birds and beasts as our own kind. If I am not 
a fellow among other people, with whom may I then associate?’ (Lunyu 18.6). 
Because Zhu Xi accepts the idea that the congruity of each of the things under 
the heavens—including human beings—is just a manifestation of one pervasive 
congruity, this requires a more nuanced argument and more detailed observation from 
Zhu Xi as to why and how humans are after all different from the myriad of things 
(wanwu 萬物) when it comes to their particular course of growth (xing 性). When 
someone asks, whether the particular course of growth (xing 性) of humans and other 
things is the same, Zhu Xi answers positively, but also adds: ‘The particular course of 
growth is most difficult to explain. If one wants to say that it is the same for people 
and other things, one can make this point; if one wants to say that it differs, one can 
make this point as well’49 (ZZYL, Ch. 4). Then someone again asks:
‘The particular course of the growth of humans and things has one source. What, then, 
constitutes the difference?’ Zhu Xi replies: ‘The particular course of growth of a human 
can be described in terms of brightness and dimness, whereas the particular course of the 
growth of a thing is just slanted and obstructed. That which is dim can be illuminated, 
whereas that which is already slanted and obstructed cannot be cleared out. Heng Qu (橫
渠)50 says, “From all the things, there is none that does not have its particular course of 
growth. In the ability to penetrate occlusions and eliminate obstructions lies the difference 
between humans and other things”’.51 (ZZYL, Ch. 4)
Zhu Xi is not arguing here that the particular course of human growth is never 
obstructed. Zhu Xi often quotes the opening lines of Zhongyong 中庸, a short treatise 
elevated by him to the status of a Confucian canon: ‘What the environment (tian 
天) dictates (ming 命) is called the course of growth (xing 性)’52 (Zhongyong 1). 
This indicates that the particular course of one’s growth cannot be a mere projection 
of one’s subjective will. The world that surrounds us asserts itself as a multitude of 
48  For the scope of reference of the notion ‘thing’ wu 物 in Chinese, see my comment in n. 10. 
49  性最難說，要說同亦得，要說異亦得。
50  This is another name of Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077). 
51 「人物之性一源，何以有異？」曰：「人之性論明暗，物之性只是偏塞。暗者可使之明， 
已偏塞者不可使之通也。橫渠言，凡物莫不有是性，由通蔽開塞，所以有人物之別。
52  天命之謂性。
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conditions that we have to reckon with. Zhu Xi also makes it clear that the ideal 
conditions revealed in the abstract and pervasive notions of li 理 and xing 性 in 
actuality appear distorted, or in Zhu Xi’s language, ‘muddied’ (hun zhuo 昏濁) 
or ‘blocked’ (ge 隔) by the matter-energy qi 氣, or simply the rough physicality 
(zhi 質) of the world’s phenomena (ZZYL, Ch. 4). However, according to Zhu Xi, 
humans have the capacity to discern what stands in the way conditioning the natural 
course of a particular person (renxing 人性) and therefore can act to accommodate 
it. Zhu Xi says, 
Humans have a congruity that can penetrate any occlusion. However, when we come to 
birds and beasts, their particular course of growth (xing 性) is constrained by their physical 
bodies. They do not have the wherewithal to penetrate whatever occlusion they arrive at 
during their growth (sheng 生).53 (ZZYL, Ch. 4) 
We have to ask, what is it that allows humans to accommodate the restrictive 
conditions in the particular course of human growth (renxing 人性)? Zhu Xi points 
out that in the case of humans, any course (xing 性) of growth (sheng 生) towards 
the ultimate congruity (zhi li 至理 or qiong li 窮理) is more subtle and nuanced, 
as it complies with four different aspects of interaction among humans and their 
environment: the empathic sensibility (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心), aesthetical sensibility 
(xiu’e zhi xin 羞惡之心), socio-cultural sensibility (cixun zhi xin 辭遜之心), and 
cognitive sensibility (shifei zhi xin 是非之心). This is a direct borrowing from the 
famous argument in Mengzi on ‘four sprouts’ (siduan 四端)—the core idea in the 
Mengzian view on renxing 人性 and arguably the central concept in the Confucian 
ethical thought since Mengzi’s time. Mengzi understands the notion of the course of 
a particular person54 (renxing 人性), or more conventionally translated as ‘human 
nature’, as something that distinguishes the human from the beast. Mengzi founds 
this difference in the function of human sensibilities xin 心 .55 Mengzi maintains 
53 然在人則蔽塞有可通之理；至於禽獸，亦是此性，只被他形體所拘，生得蔽隔之甚， 
無可通處。
54  The rendition of renxing 人性 as the ‘the course of particular person’ should be distinguished 
from another notion widely used in both classical and Song periods—rendao 人道, or the ‘human 
way’. The difference is that the latter means the generalized way or manner that humans pattern their 
interactions with the surrounding. Renxing 人性, on the other hand, while also referring to something 
shared among all humans, specifically denotes the particular course of a unique person living in this 
world. In other words, renxing 人性 is seen as the actualized and concrete instance of a rendao 
人道. Zhu Xi refers to the dao 道 as to the term with a broad scope (dao zi bao de da 道字包得大); 
dao 道 it is said ‘can be explained as a road; generally speaking, it is a common human road’ (道訓路, 
大概說人所共由之路; ZZYL, Ch. 6). 
55  The term xin 心 is usually translated as the ‘heart-mind’, indicating both cognitive and af-
fective capacities of humans. Although it is not a bad translation, it has its own limitations. On the 
one hand, it seems too static and substantial once applied to the worldview, in which, as Ames and 
Rosemont claim, ‘it is frequently observed that, with respect to the human body, physiology has 
priority over anatomy, and function takes precedence over site’ (Ames, Rosemont 1998, 56). On the 
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that everyone would be naturally moved by seeing an infant about to fall into a well. 
Therefore, he claims that ‘All humans have the sensibility (xin 心) that reacts to the 
unbearable situations of others’56 (Mengzi 2A6). Mengzi concludes that: 
If there is no sense of empathy, there is no human being. If there is no sense of disgust, there 
is no human being. If there is no sense of deference, there is no human being. If there is no 
sense of approval, there is no human being.57 (Ibid.) 
Mengzi calls these four aspects of human sensibilities the four sprouts (siduan 
四端) and indicates that these are the starting points for the development of the 
four human excellences in their interactions: ‘The sense of empathy is the sprout of 
attentive conduct (ren 仁); the sense of disgust is the sprout of appropriate conduct 
(yi義); the sense of deference is the sprout of ritualized conduct (li 禮); the sense of 
approval is the sprout of wise conduct (zhi 智)’58 (ibid.). Mengzi sums it up in his 
famous saying that the particular course of human growth leans towards the good59 
(ren xing shan 人性善).
Zhu Xi incorporates this idea of the four sprouts into his own system and ascribes 
these to the renxing 人性. Zhu Xi says: ‘In humans, attentiveness, appropriateness, 
rite observance, and knowing are the course of growth (xing 性)’ (ZZYL, Ch. 4). 
Since for Zhu Xi every particular course of growth of a thing (xing 性) is also a 
particular instance of that thing’s congruity (li 理), which, in turn, is a manifestation 
of the pervasive li (yi li 一理), it is natural that Zhu Xi attributes the four distinctly 
human aspects of their course of interaction to the pervasive and the world generating 
congruity: ‘The course of growth of a particular thing (xing 性) is the fruition (shi 
實) of congruity (li 理) that encompasses attentiveness, appropriateness, observance 
of the rites, and knowing’60 (ZZYL, Ch. 5). The result of this identification of 
specifically human excellences with a pervasive cosmological notion of congruity 
li 理 is twofold. On the one hand, Zhu Xi provides a cosmological argument to the 
long standing dispute on the goodness of natural human tendencies (renxing 人性). 
Renxing 人性 cannot be anything but the course of growth towards the good because 
the world generating pervasive congruity li 理 and the particular course of human 
growing renxing 人性 share the same qualities of interaction. This does not mean 
that all humans are good, because Zhu Xi, just like Mengzi before him, saw the four 
other hand, since in Mengzi xin 心 is understood as initiating a response to the cognitive or affective 
experience, the connotation lacking in the term ‘heart–mind’. I translate xin 心 as ‘sensibility’ and 
define it as a reaction triggering perception of external stimuli.
56  人皆有不忍人之心。
57 無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。
58 惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。
59   For reading of shan 善 as an inclination rather than ready-made quality see Ames 2010, 141. 
60  性是實理，仁義禮智皆具。For attribution of the four sprouts (siduan 四端) to the li 理 also 
see ZZYL, Chapters 1, 4, 9, 14, 25, 83. 
112 V Y T I S  S I L I U S
sprouts (siduan 四端) as something that has to be brought to the fruition in the course 
of growth rather than as fixed qualities that are ready for humans to use:
Someone asked Zhu Xi, ‘does the particular course [of humans] entail benevolence, 
appropriateness, observance of rites, and knowing?’ Zhu Xi replied: ‘This is more likely 
when said about “the particular course of the one who fully realized [himself]”’.61 
(ZZYL, Ch. 4) 
This brings the cosmological notion of li 理 to the very center of Zhu Xi’s ethical 
doctrine. This term for neo-Confucian forerunners—the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, 
Zhou Dunyi—was the axis of their cosmological and ontological speculations. Zhu Xi 
made it into an ethical category. 
On the other hand, Zhu Xi also dramatically expands the meaning and function 
of renxing 人性. This development had an important influence on Zhu Xi’s practical 
philosophy because the identification of renxing 人性 with the cosmological notion 
of congruity li 理 explains how, according to the Daxue 大學 canon, the development 
of one’s own person can ultimately lead to the harmonization of the whole world 
(see Daxue). Thus, Zhu Xi provides a theoretical ground for the classical Confucian 
understanding about the fundamental relatedness of all things under the heaven, to 
the extent that cultivation of one’s person has not only private personal or common 
socio-political outcomes, but also inevitably leads to the changes in the cosmos. This 
understanding can be seen in an old dictum found in the classical Confucian text, the 
Zhongyong 中庸: 
Only those of utmost creativity (zhicheng 至誠) in the world are able to make the most of 
their natural tendencies (xing 性). Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own natural 
tendencies is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others; only if one is 
able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others is one able to make the most of 
the natural tendencies of processes and events (wu 物); only if one is able to make the most 
of the natural tendencies of processes and events can one assist in the transforming and 
nourishing activities of heaven and earth; and only if one can assist in the transforming and 
nourishing activities of heaven and earth can human beings take their place as members of 
this triad. (Zhong Yong 22; translation from Ames, Hall 2001, 105) 
Conclusion
The prevailing claim in a large part of contemporary scholarship is that the nature 
of Zhu Xi’s renewal of classical Confucian thought lies in the fact that in his theory 
of li 理, Zhu Xi provides an ontological (or metaphysical) foundation to classical 
Confucian ethics. The untold assumption behind this claim is that the ontology deals 
with more essenti[al, more basic reality than ethics, which is only derivative and 
61  問：「性具仁義禮智？」曰：「此猶是說『成之者性』。 
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supplementary. Therefore, ethical concerns purportedly need justification in some 
outside realm. In this paper we have showed shown that for Zhu Xi, such separation 
of cosmology, that is, the general inquiry into the presence of things, from ethics, 
that is, the inquiry into the specifically human attitude to his or her environment, 
is not a relevant question. It seems that the question of the foundations of morality 
or the moral motivation (why to be moral?) that contemporary moral philosophers 
are asking, for Zhu Xi, would seem as feasible as the question of the imaginable 
‘ontological motivation’ (why to be?). Just as one has to be in order to be able to ask 
the latter question, equally one already has to have ethical concerns in order to be able 
to ask the former. That means that ethical feelings come to human experience as the 
primary and immediate reality. Therefore, in the view of the classical Confucians as 
well as Zhu Xi, to anyone inquiring into our world of experience ethics, paraphrasing 
Emmanuel Levinas, is the first philosophy.
This essay has shown that the realms of inquiry that can be called cosmology and 
ethics do closely correlate in Zhu Xi’s philosophy through linking the cosmological 
notion of persistent congruity (li 理) as a necessary condition for all things to be 
present with a notion of a particular course of growth (xing 性) of things. This 
ultimately allows Zhu Xi to show the link between the li 理 and the concept of a 
particular course of human growth (renxing 人性) that entails a classical Confucian 
ethical notion of specifically human sensibilities (xin 心) and excellences in human 
interrelation with the environment (ren yi li 仁義理智). By linking the neo-Confucian 
cosmological notion of li 理 with the classical Confucian ethical notion of renxing 人性 
Zhu Xi does in the sense provide a cosmological foundation for Confucian ethics. 
After all, that provides him with an argument for the Mengzian claim that a particular 
course of human growth tends toward goodness (xing shan 性善). However, it seems 
that Zhu Xi’s main concern was to appropriate the term li 理, which in his time was 
widely used in Buddhist metaphysical speculations and was also adapted by the early 
neo-Confucians in their cosmological discussions, and to show its relevance and 
conformity to the ethical teachings of classical Confucian way. 
In this essay it was demonstrated that the Zhuxian notion of li 理 is in accordance 
with the naturalistic understanding of the term during the classical period of Chinese 
thought. In the Zhuxian cosmology, li 理 facilitates the generation of things in the 
world, but is not seen as a metaphysical concept referring to the transcendent source 
of reality. At the same time, Zhu Xi’s philosophy should not be seen as an ontology 
that inquires into the nature and essence of the being as such. According to Zhu Xi, 
what from the general perspective of the whole world is seen as congruity (li 理), that 
is, a persistent and necessary condition of all things present, appears as a particular 
course of growth (xing 性) when seen from the perspective of each particular thing. 
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By the virtue of the specifically human sensibility (xin 心), a particular human course 
of growth (renxing 人性) exhibits the most subtle and refined ways of the congruity 
(li 理), that is, the correlation with the environment. This brings the cosmological 
notion of li 理 to the very center of Zhu Xi’s ethical doctrine. The identification of li 
理 and renxing 人性 not only gives a cosmological basis for Confucian ethics, but, 
more importantly, makes li 理 into a key ethical notion in the Confucian tradition. 
In this way, Zhu Xi extends the specifically human and moral sphere to encompass 
even the inanimate nature and enlarges the range of human agency and the scope of 
its impact to the ability to transform the world structure.
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